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THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA
By G. W. C. Ross*
Y EARS BEFORE Professor Hayek startled and enchanted the
National Association of Manufacturers with his Portolano
chart of the Road to Serfdom' a British historian had confidently
heralded the advent of the Servile State becoming inevitable
through the very measures that "liberals" and "reformers" urged
for the benefit of wage-earners. "The principle of a minimum wage
involves as its converse the principle of compulsory labour....
Lastly, there is the obvious bludgeon of 'compulsory arbitration:'
A bludgeon so obvious that it is revolting even to our proletariat."'2
It is probably needless to remind the reader that the leaders of the
American "labor movement" have been adamant in their resistance
to all suggestions looking toward any legal scheme of compulsory
arbitration; and The New Republic during this past summer laid it
down ex cathedra, that-"Compulsory arbitration . . . is not con-
sonant with the practices of a 'free society' in which industry is
privately owned and businessmen can make profits." 3
The editors of "The New Republic" evidently could not regard
Australia as a "free society" in which "businessmen can make
profits"; although industry certainly is privately owned in that
country and it is commonly considered to have one of the most
*Professor of Law, College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.
"Univ. of Chicago Press, 1944.
2Belloc, The Servile State (Constable & Co., London, 1913, 1927),
pp. 172, 176. "The future of industrial society . . . is a future in which
subsistence and security shall be guaranteed for the Proletariat, but . . .
by" (their) "establishment . . . in a status really, though not nominally
servile. At the same time the Owners will be guaranteed in their profits, the
whole machinery of production in ... that stability which has been lost under
the Capitalist phase of society :" Id, p. 183.
3No. 1596: Vol. 113, p. 3 (July 2, 1945).
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democratic of governments. It is said to be one of the most thor-
oughly unionized countries in the world; and its Labor Party has
been powerful, and much of the time dominant in its politics for
many years.' But Australia also has enjoyed-or suffered-com-
pulsory arbitration ever since very early in this century.
It is well known that the Australian constitutional system is
much like our own, a federal set-up, in which the National ("Com-
monwealth") Government has only its delegated, enumerated
powers which ificlude, however, a comprehensive grant of "inci-
dental" power ;5 while the general, residuary power of government
belongs to the States.6 But provisions of a "bill of rights" character
for the most part are lacking in the Australian Constitution. It
contains nothing corresponding to our "due process" requirements
7
nor any "impairment of the obligation of contracts" clause nor any
guaranty against slavery or "involuntary servitude." Australian
government can constitutionally become highly "totalitarian.""
In its commercial provisions the Australian Constitution follows
closely the American model. The Commonwealth Parliament has
authority to "make laws . . . with respect to: (i) Trade and com-
merce with other countries and among the States."9 Regulation of
intrastate commerce is thereby reserved (sub silentio) to the States.
But in the field of labor relations the Australian Constitution de-
4About 2 members of trade-unions per 17 of the country's total population
(in 1931) ; Cf. Portus, Australia, an Economic Interpretation (1933), p. 50.5The Commonwealth "Parliament has power to make laws ... with re-
spect to: ... (xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power vested
by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the
Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal judicature, or in any de-
partment or officer of the Commonwealth :" Aus'n Const., Sec. 51 Cf. U. S.
Const., Art. I, sec. 8 (18).6Cf. the Aus'n Const., Secs. 52, 107, 108, 109 and the U. S. Const., Art.
VI (2), and Amend. X.
7Cf. the U. S. Const., Amend. V and Amend. XIV, Sec. 1.
Slbid. Art. I, sec. 10, and Amend. XIII. The Australian Constitution does
require the Commonwealth to exercise the right of eminent domain only "on
just terms," i.e., of compensation to the expropriated owner; but apart from
acquisition of private property by the Government, Australian legislation can
be nakedly and flagrantly confiscatory without running foul of constitutional
inhibitions. Following the Great Depression Australian statutes freely altered
the terms of antecedent contracts; e.g., by reducing the 'ate of interest stipu-
lated to accrue on outstanding obligations. Cf. Wanganui v. Aus'n Mutual So-
ciety, (1934) 50 C. L. R. 581; Barcelo v. Electrolytic Zinc Co., (1933) 48
C. L. R. 391; Johnston, etc., Proprietary v. Comm'th, (1943) 67 C. L. R. 314;
Minister for the Army v. Dalziel, (1944) 68 C. L. R. 261; Peacock v. Newtbn,"
etc., Coop. Society, (1943) 67 C. L. R. 25. "The contention that a law of the
Commonwealth is invalid because not in conformity with Magna Carta is not
one for serious refutation," per Griffith, C. J., in Chia Gee v. Martin, (1905)
3 C. L. R. 649. Cf. the present writer, in 29 Va. Law Rev. 1028, 1038, n. 43. Cf.,
accord., Delaney v. Gt. Western Milling Co., (1916) 22 C. L. R. 150.9Aus'n Const., Sec. 51.
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parts markedly from its American prototype. It does not, any more
than the American document, empower the Commonwealth to regu-
late conditions of employment or the terms of the employment
contract directly by national legislation, except so far as that can
be done "incidentally" as an adjunct of the commerce power. The
Commonwealth Parliament, e.g., cannot enact a general minimum
wage law for the country, although by manipulating its commerce
power it can, like our own Congress, go a long way in that direc-
tion. Early in its history the High Court of Australia sustained
Commonwealth legislation for workmen's compensation to seamen
injured in foreign or interstate voyages.10 A later Commonwealth
statute required employers to prefer members of recognized trade
unions in hiring longshoremen and such-like waterside workers;
and the High Court upheld the Act. Who should take part in
foreign or interstate commerce could be determined by the legis-
lative power that governed such commerce. "True . . . the pro-
vision adopts a description of the persons . . . to be so preferred
which has no apparent relation to any characteristic of interstate
or overseas commerce .... But ... it directly regulates the choice
of person to perform ... work which forms part of it or is incident
in" (such) "commerce. ' " If Commonwealth legislation can thus
control the persons who may work in interstate or foreign com-
merce it would seem it could equally control the wages to be paid
them for such work. But of course its regulations on that basis
could apply only to employment in foreign or interstate commerce,
not to conditions of labor in intrastate commerce.12
But while the Australian Constitution thus denies the Common-
wealth an independent legislative authority over the relation of
employer and employe, by another provision it confers upon the
Commonwealth Government a comprehensive authority to "Make
'
0 Aus'n SS. Co. v. Malcolm, (1914) 19 C. L. R. 298.
"Huddart-Parker Co. v. Comm'th, (1931) 44 C. L. R. 492, per Dixon, J.
(concurring). Cf. Starke, J. (diss.), that the "power ... is not to make laws
with respect to employment in foreign or interstate trade, ... but to make laws
with respect to foreign and interstate ... commerce as such." Cf. Ross, in 29
Va. Law Rev. 881, 911ff (1943).
12Cf. Newcastle & Hunter v. A. G., (1921) 29 C. L. R. 357. So, in America,
an act of Congress establishing employer's liability for injuries sustained by
any employes of railroads engaged in interstate commerce was unconstitutional,
since many employes of such railroads might themselves.not be engaged in such
commerce, First Employers Liability Cases, (1908) 207 U. S. 463, 28 S. Ct.
141, 52 L. Ed. 297; but an amended act which confined the statutory liabilities
to cover only railroad employes" actually engaged in interstate commerce was
constitutional, Second Employers' Liability Cases, (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct.
169, 56 L. Ed. 327. Cf. U. S. v. Darby, (1941) 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85
L. Ed. 609.
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laws... with respect to: . . . (xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration
for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending
beyond the limits of any one State."'13 Tlie last clause of this sub-
section does not limit the Commonwealth's arbitral power to dis-
putes arising in foreign or interstate commerce, or in commerce at
all. A national union of bricklayers, e.g., may get into a dispute
with its members' employers over their wages or working con-
ditions, although it may be that none of the workers or their em-
ployers is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. This national
arbitral authority is an independent power, not derived from nor
limited upon the Commonwealth's commerce power. No provision
of their Constitution has staked out an ampler or more remunera-
tive Happy Hunting Ground for the lawyers of the Island Con-
tinent; nor, it may safely be assumed, engendered more severe head-
aches for its judges.
It will be noted that this arbitral authority is not self-executing,
like the judicial power of the United States Supreme Court under
Article III of our Constitution. The Australian Constitution sets
up no constitutional tribunal to arbitrate labor disputes. The power
granted is legislative, to "make laws with respect to" such arbitra-
tion (and conciliation). The scope,'and the method as well, of
exercising the arbitral function must be based and dependent upon
Commonwealth legislation. Very promptly following federation of
the Australian Colonies the new Commonwealth Parliament pro-
ceeded to establish a Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration
Court.' 4 Th& Act did not give the individual workingman a right
of access to the Court. Only a tra'de-union, registered and formally
recognized as such, could be a party before the Court adverse to
an employer or an association or organization of employers. The
Court, in other words, was to deal only with "organized labor," not
with individual laborers.
The constitutional provision does not use the word "adjudicate"
nor say in any explicit form that the Commonwealth may prescribe
a scheme of "compulsory arbitration," but it seems to have been
taken for granted from the .beginning that such a scheme was con-
templated and would be within the constitutional power. From the
beginning the arbitral tribunal has been called the Conciliation and
Arbitration "Court." But is it indeed a court? One who arbitrates
an industrial dispute-is his award 'a judicial decision? The typical
'3Aus'n Const., Sec. 51.
'4Cf. the C6mm'th Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-1934.
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judicial decision has a retroactive basis and effect, as Mr. Justice
Holmes has pointed out.15 It determines that present rights and
obligations have resulted from things the parties did in the past.
Yesterday A drove carelessly and ran over B; therefore A today
owes B a sum in damages. That mode of description does not seem
to fit an industrial award, which looks wholly to the future; the
employer henceforth shall pay such-and-such wages for work to be
done hereafter. And the award prescribes these wages, not at all
as a result of whatever theparties may have done in the past, but
through the arbitrator's appraisal of present and probable future
conditions. All that does not wear the aspect of a judicial decision.
But if it is not judicial, where does it belong in our (and Aus-
tralia's) traditional and constitutional tripartitedistribution of gov-
ernmental activity? Of course, unless made legally compulsory, in-
dustrial arbitration is not an activity of Government at all. At com-
mon law, parties are not required to submit industrial disputes to
arbitration; and even if they do submit them, they are not required
to abide by the arbitrator's award, unless by contract in advance they
have bound themselves to abide by it. Moreover, the scope of the
common law arbitrator's award is subject to all existing laws. If
a statute, e.g., forbids more than 10 hours work a day in bakeries,
an arbitrator between employing and employed bakers cannot by
award prescribe an 11 hour day. Does it alter that situation to
make arbitration compulsory? The first Chief Justice of the High
Court of Australia insisted that it did not. The Constitution bad
not given the Commonwealth any legislative authority over terms
of employment. That remained exclusively in the hands of the
States. The Commonwealth's power to make arbitration com-
pulsory meant only that it could require employers and employes
to submit their disputes to the Conciliation and Arbitration Court
and to abide by its awards, but that Court could award only such
conditions of employment as a common law arbitrator could award;
that is to say, only such conditions as the parties might lawfully
have prescribed for themselves by their own voluntary contract.1 6
The "real" point to all that was, that the Australian States have
comprehensive legislative authority to regulate conditions of em-
ployment. By state statutes they can fix miiimuni wages and
'
5Sc. (diss.) in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., (1910) 215 U. S. 349, 54 L.
Ed. 228.
lOCf. Griffith, C. J., in Federated Employes v. Moore & Sons, (1909) 8
C. L. R. 465; Aus'n Boottrade Employes v. Whybrow, (1910) 10 C. L. R. 266;
Waterside Workers v. Alexander, (1918) 25 C. L. R. 434.
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maximum hours; or vice versa, for that matter.17 Hence, said Chief
Justice Griffith, if a state statute sets a minimum wage of ten
shillings the Commonwealth Arbitration Court cannot by award
enable employers in that State to pay only eight shillings. He was
trying to preserve "State rights" in the field of labor relations. And
so limited, this arbitral power of the Commonwealth, he said, was a
judicial power.'"
From the outset some of the High Court Justices refused to
accept this doctrine. They declared the Constitution intended to
enable the Commonwealth Parliament to give its Arbitration Court
complete authority effectively to settle industrial disputes, which
meant authority to award whatever terms might be needful to that
end, in disregard, if need be, of any inconsistent state laws. They
freely admitted that on that theory the Arbitration Court's function
was not judicial; rather, it was legislative. Its awards were tanta-
mount, vis-a-vis state laws, to Commonwealth statutes. 19 It is this
theory that has prevailed, though the theoretical, question recurs
to vex the minds of Australian justices.20 It amounts in effect to
this: The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court is in
a position to say to contending employers and employes who are
before it: "These are the conditions of employment that you will
observe, whether you like them or not; whether they are conditions
that either of you would ever have agreed to by contract or not;
whether, indeed, they are even conditions that you could lawfully
have bound yourselves to by contract or not."
Some features of the Arbitration Tribunal's work are, however;
held to be judicial. The statute under which it operates gives it
power to fix and impose penalties for violation of its awards. The
171.e., maximum wages and minimum hours. Note that there is no "Thir-
teenth Amendment" to the Constitution of Australia. Cf. Ante, Note 8.
i8Whether such an arbitral power as Chief Justice Griffith postulated is "ju-
dicial" or not, is a fascinating question in theoretic jurisprudence. Although a ju-
dicial decision purports to determine "present" rights, it may equally well be de-
scribed as a command to do something in the (immediate) future: to pay money,
to deliver a deed, to stop picketing, or what-not. And'students of the history of
the common law are aware that to say the rights adjudicated have resulted from
past events by virtue of "pre-existing" rules of law ignores the fact that the rules
of the common law pre-exist only in the breast of the courts themselves. Any
authoritative settlement of any dispute, whether the dispute were as to present
rights under pre-existing rules vel non, is a judicial decision, said Chief Justice
Griffith. Cf. the cases cited ante, Note 16.
19Cf. especially, Isaacs, J., in the cases cited ante, Note 16. A later Com-
monwealth statute will supersede inconsistent provisions of an earlier award
of the Conciliation and Arbitration- Court, (ner. con.) Victorian Stevedoring
Co. and Meakes v. Dignan, (1931) 46 C. L. R. 73.
2 Cf. Jacka v. Lewis, (1944) 68 C. L. R. 455; Clyde Engineering Co. v.
Cowburn, (1926) 37 C. L. R. 466; Colvin v. Bradley Bros., (1943) 68 C. L. R.
151.
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Australian Constitution provides that federal judges shall be re-
movable only by parliamentary address "on the ground of proved
misbehavior or incapacity." 21 The original arbitration statute pro-
vided that a Justice of the High Court should be designated by the
Government to act as President of the Arbitration Court for a seven
year term, without additional salary. The High Court held that
the power given the Arbitration Court to fix and impose its own
penalties was certainly judicial, which, therefore, could not be ex-
ercized by an appointee for a term of years.2 2 The statute thereupon
was amended to provide for separate appointment of Justices to
the Arbitration Court specifically, who were to be removable only
on parliamentary address.
Although in making its awards the Arbitration Court is now
deemed to act legislatively rather than judicially, yet it is only this
"Court" that can legislate for the Commonwealth in that field. As
already noted, the Commonwealth Parliament itself cannot by gen-
eral legislation regulate the terms of employment contractd, except
in relation to interstate or foreign commerce.2 3 And the Court's
authority is limited to the settlement of particular disputes. Its
awards can bind only adversary parties actually brought before it.
It cannot enact any "common" or general rule to regulate the terms
of employment in any given industry or occupation throughout the
country.2 4 That limitation directs attention to the scope and mean-
21Sec. 72.22Waterside Workers v. Alexander, (1918) 25 C. L. R. 434. An award
duly made by the Court cannot be set aside under a special statute, by Com-
missioners appointed ad hoc by the Government; Aus'n Rys. Union v. Vic-
torian Rys. Comsnrs., (1930) 44 C. L. R. 319. Cf. accord., Federated Engine
Drivers v. Adelaide Chem. Co., (1920) 28 C. L. R. 1; Ex parte Engineers,
(1926) 38 C. L. R. 563; Silk Bros. Proprietary v. State Elect. Comsn., (1943)
67 C. L. R. 1; Peacock v. Newton, &c., Soc., (1943) 67 C. L. R. 25.
2 2Cf. ante, Notes 10-12, and text; and cf. Waterside Workers v. Comm'th
SS. Owners, (1920) 28 C. I. R. 209, especially, per Isaacs and Rich, 3. J.
(concurring).
24The award may, however, be made to bind assignees and successors
of the immediate parties; cf. Hudson v. Aus'n Timber Workers, (1922) 32
C. L. R. 413; Amalgamated Engineering Union v. Metal Trades Ass'n, (1935)
53 C. L. R. 658. And it may bind employers who have no members of the Ap-
plicant union in their service; though it seems uncertain whether it can bind
such employers with respect to the terms upon which they may employ such
non-union workmen, if it permits them to run an open shop at all. Cf. Aus'n
Timber Workers v. John Sharp & Sons, (1919) 26 C. L. R. 302; Burwood
Cinema v. Aus'n Theatrical Employes, (1925) 35 C. L. R. 528; Amalgamated
Engineers v. Alderdice Proprietary, (1928) 41 C. L. R. 402; In Re American
Drycleaning Co., (1929) 43 C. L. R. 29. To an uncertain extent these decisions
rest on statutory construction rather than on constitutional doctrine. For the
scope of the dispute as limiting the possible scope of the award, cf. Aus'n Boot-
trade Employes v. Whybrow, (1910) 11 C. L. R., 1, 311; Aus'n Workers v.
Graziers, (1932) 47 C. L. R. 22; Federated Millers v. Butcher, (1932) 47
C. L. R. 246; Aus'n Tramways v. Comsnr., (1935) 53 C. L. R. 90.
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ing of the word "dispute" in the constitutional provision. No sooner
had the new arbitration tribunal been set up than trade-union
officials began a practice of presenting to employers a "log" or
specification of demands, with a notice that unless the employers
assented to these demands within a stated length of time the union or
unions making the demands would apply to the Arbitration Court to
award the same, without any attempt or intent to negotiate with
the employers, to arrive at any compromise or any agreement what-
ever with respect to the demands, other than their unconditional
and unqualified assent to them precisely as made, verbatim et
literatim; without any attempt, that is, to do anything that could
fairly be called "bargaining" with the employers. Moreover, the
union officials would do that "on their own," without any vote or
other expression of the wishes'of the general membership, or any-
thing definitely indicating any discontent on the part of the em-
ployes with existing conditions. Confronted -with such situations,
the first Chief Justice of the High Court again insisted that such
bare presentation of demands upon employers could not be con-
sidered a "dispute" that could give the Arbitration Court any juris-
diction to make an award. "Some real opportunity of" (for?) "dis-
cussion of an industrial claim . . .must be afforded before it can
develop .into an industrial dispute." A "real and genuine dispute
. . . is not created by a mere formal demand and formal refusal,
without more .... If . . .there is in fact no real discontent exist-
ing, a mere claim or request made. .. for the mere purpose of mak-
ing a case.... before the Federal arbitration authority does not con-
stitute a real industrial dispute. It is rather an attempt to promote
strife, and a fraud upon the. tribunal."25 And in another early case
two Justices asserted that submission of a "log" of demands to em-
ployers merely as "a step to the Court," and without "the expecta-
tion or even ... desire of obtaining any concession from" the em-
ployers could not be deemed a "dispute" to ground any jurisdiction
2 5Per Griffith, C. J., in Ex parte 1{olyman, (1912) 15 C. L. R. 586; and
cf. the Felt Hatters Case, (1914) 18 C. L. R. 88, per Griffith, C. J. and Barton,
J. (concurring). In line with this and his general point of view, Chief Justice
Griffith urged further, that discontent however pronounced, with conditions of
employment prescribed by a State law could not constitute an "industrial
dispute," to enable the Arbitration Court to award inconsistent terms. Such
discontent "cannot be described as a dispute ;" it is only a "political agitation,"
Federated Employes v. Moore & Sons, (1909) 8 C. L. R. 465 (ante, Note 16).
Cf., accord, Gavan Duffy, J. (concurring specially), in Waterside Workers v.
Comm'th S 1. Owners (ante, Note 23), that where an award specified that it
should remain in force for a stated length of time, discontent with its terms
during that time could not be a "dispute" justiciable before the Court.
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in the Arbitration Court.26 The evident gist of the position was
that the Court could have jurisdiction only to bring to a conclusion
a process of bona fide "collective bargaining" which had failed to
culminate in an agreement. But again, in these cases and through-
out, that position met determined and persistent dissent and re-
sistance from other Justices.2 7 Curiously enough, the position was
taken by the very Justices who at the same time insisted that in-
dustrial arbitration was a "judicial" procedure. But one who has
a legal cause of action is never required to attempt to compromise
it with his adversary before haling the latter into court. Even bare
demand and refusal are required only in some classes of cases.
Per cantra, the Justices who regarded compulsory arbitration as
having a "legislative" character were the ones who would assimilate
industrial demands to a justiciable "cause of action," requiring only
their refusal to support the Arbitration Court's jurisdiction; such
refusal, further, to be implied from failure to express assent.28 It
is not found that the early cases, whose disposition reflected on the
whole Chief Justice Griffith's point of view, have been categorically
and completely overruled. But his position involves this manifest
practical difficulty: how imuch negotiation must parties conduct?
How long and how persistently must they persevere in trying to
work out an agreement for themselves before the matter can be
deposited in the lap of the Court? The impossibility of any definitive
answer makes it inevitable that the actual trend of the Court's atti-
tude would be progressively to whittle down any requirement of
preliminary negotiation, and to take jurisdiction more and more
nearly orr the basis of mere demand and refusal. In the final analysis
it is believed safe to say that recourse to the Court has become in
26The Tramways Case, (1914) 19 C. L. R. 43, per Gavan Duffy and Rich,
JJ. (concurring). As an advocate for employes (or employers) "How can I
be sure that the dispute will be regarded as a real one unless I succeed in im-
porting into it a touch of acrimony?" Menzies, in Ch. III of "Studies in the
Australian Constitution" (ed. by Portus; Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1933),
p. 62.
27Cf. especially, in the cases that have been cited, opinions by Justices
Isaacs, Higgins and Rich.2SThe situation illustrates the modern psychologists' maxim, that the
"good reasons" advanced are not always one's "real reasons ;" although the real
reasons of the respective factions here are plainly enough disclosed in their
opinions. As already remarked (ante, Note 18, and text), Chief Justice Griffith
and his supporters wished to maintain "State rights" and curtail the authority
of the Commonwealth and its Arbitration Court; while the real animus of the
contrary opinions was to augment the effective power of the Commonwealth
in the field of labor relations. The controversy is as perennial in Australia
as it has been in this country. Cf. the present writer, in 29 Va. Law Rev. 881,
911ff, 941ff (1943).
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effect available as a complete substitute fdr the entire procedure of
collective bargaining, and not merely as a supplement thereto or
final step in that procedure.2 The trend undoubtedly has been
assisted by the fact that the constitutional provision authorizes
Commonwealth "conciliation" as well as "arbitration," and the "pre-
vention" as well as the "settlement" of industrial disputes. So it
is held that the Arbitration Court may take cognizance of a dispute
that is merely "threatened or impending 'or probable."30
To be subject to compulsory arbitration the dispute must be an
"industrial" one. The High Court of Australia followed the United
States Supreme Court in distinguishing generally between "in-
dustry" and "commerce."3' But does the term "industrial dispute"
then include o1jly such'as arise between employers and employes
engaged in some sort of manufacturing, fabricating or processing
occupation? Are the- sales clerks in a department store "industrial"
employes? In the sphere of private employment the term has not
been narrowly confined. A dispute between a bank and its officers
and employes, such as branch managers, tellers, security clerks,
cashiers,, is an "industrial dispute," as is one between an insurance
2
-The Justices of the High Court of Australia have the bad habit of in-
sistently writing their individual opinions in extenro, both concurring and
dissenting, in important cases. This beclouds constitutional doctrine. The true
ratio decidendi of the decision is likely to be obscure and difficult to disen-
tangle. Cf. Portus, Australia, an Economic Interpretation (1933) ; "Not even
body-line bowling has caused as much discussion in Australia as compulsory
arbitration....; The existing jumble . . . has resulted in a huge game of hide-
and-seek, in vhich perspiring union secretaries run after justices suspected of
radicalism, while equally perspiring company lawyers endeavor to head them
off .... Until . . . regulation of industrial conditions is placed wholly in the
hands of National authorities, it cannot fairly be claimed that the system of
wage regulation has had a fair trial in Australia." pp. 80-83. Cf., accord,
Powers, J., in The Tramways Case (ante, Note 26), that if employes were ta
continue to resort to the Arbitration Court instead of to strikes, the "bog of
technicalities" that had come to, envelop the field "must be cleared out of the
way." Cf. Aus'n Tramways v. Comsnr., (1937) 58 C. L. R. 436, especially, per
Evatt, J. (concurring).
3oPer Higgins, J., in The Pastoralists' Case, (1917) 23 C. L. R. 22. Cf.
Merchant Service Guild v. Newcastle & Hunter, (1913) 16 C. L. R. 591. An
industrial dispute between a craft union and an employer who employs no
members of that union may be "probable" if the union's members will
"probably" apply to him for employment, per Higgins, J., in Aus'n Timber
Workers v. John Sharp & Sons, (1919) 26 C. L. R. 302 (Cf. ante, Note 24).
And where an Applicant union's demands so specify the Arbitration Court's
award may fix the terms upon which the Respondent employers may employ
non-union workmen in that same craft; Metal Trades Ass'n v. Amalgamated
Engineering Union, (1935) 54 C. L. R. 387. Cf., accord, Long v. Chubbs,
&c., Co., (1935) 53 C. L. R. 143.
3'Cf. Peterswald v. Bartley, (1904) 1 C. L. R. 497; Rex v. Gates, (1928)
41 C. L. R. 519.
INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION' IN AUSTRALIA
company and -its agents, inspectors and clerks . 2 But the High
Court held, to begin with, that a state 3 could not be summoned
before the Commonwealth Arbitration Court.3 4 When after some
years that doctrine was overruled the Court still insisted that a
State could be compelled to arbitrate only its disputes with its "in-
dustrial" officials or employes. The railways in Australia are owned
and operated by the States, and it was immediately held that a State
must submit to the Arbitration Court disputes with its employes
working on its railways.3 5 The same year the High Court required
submission of disputes with State employes serving under the pub-
lic harbor authorities.30 In later cases which were not carried to
the High Court the Arbitration Court held itself competent to sub-
ject to its jurisdiction a dispute between the State of New South
Wales and the employes in its Government Printing Office, and a
dispute with State health inspectors, and to make an award fixing
salaries of the executive managers of state owned railways.A7 But
in 1929 the High Court elaborately reconsidered the whole prob-
lem and held that the public school teachers were not "industrial"
employes of their States ;38 and during the present war the High
Court has reiterated that the Commonwealth, even under the de-
fence power, cannot compel arbitration between a State and its
general "public service" employes engaged neither in war work nor
in any "industrial" activity. 9 But any general defifiition of the
term "industrial" remains extremely obscure. In the School-
teachers' Case 40 the Court pretty much threw up its hands. Probably
it were wiser, said Mr. Justice Rich (concurring), not to attempt
3
-Aus'n Ins. Federation v. Accident Ass'n; and Bank Officials Ass'n v.
Bank of Australia, (1923) 33 C. L. R. 517. For journalism, see Daily News v.
Journalists' Ass'n, (1920) 27 C. L. R. 532.
S3The constituent members of the federated Commonwealth of Australia
are called the "States" as in America.34Federated Amalgamated Ry. Ass'n v. N. S. W. Ry. Employes Ass'n,
(1906) 4 C. L. R. 488.
35Amalgamated Soc. v. Adelaide SS. Co., (1920) 28 C. L. R. 129.
3 0Merchants Service Guild v. Comm'th SS. Owners' Ass'n, (1920) 28
C. L. R. 436.
37Cf. (1923) Merchants Service Guild v. Adelaide SS. Co., Ltt., 17
Comm. Arb. Rep. 497; (1924) The Printing Ind. Employes' Union v. Arbuckle
Waddell Prop., Ltd., 22 Comm. Arb. Rep. 247; (1927) Aus'n Ry. Union v.
Vict. Ry. Comm'rs, 25 Comm. Arb. Rep. 1054.
38Federated School Teachers v. Vict., (1929) 41 C. L. R. 569.'
39Rex v. Comm'th Concil. & Arb. Ct. and Vict. v. Comm'th, (1942) 66
C. L. R. 488; Pidoto v. Vict., (1943) 68 C. L. R. 87; and Cf. Rex v. Comm.
Concil. & Arb. Ct. and Ex parte Vict., (1944) 68 C. L. R. 485.40Note 38, ante.
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"any full definition." "It is not necessary to define what is a dog
when we determine that a certain animal is a dog."'41 Nor can it
be said that the later cases have materially clarified the point,
though the latest one that has been found does hold explicitly that
the assessors who value land for the State's property tax are not
"industrial" employes. 42 And in the Schoolteachers Case Mr. Justice
Isaacs (dissenting) had conceded, and indeed emphasized, that
undoubtedly "Crown officials" "administering true, essential gov-
ernmental authority" are not "industrial" employes of the State.
"No one has ever thought that Treasury officials performing duties
under the State railway systems are within the Commonwealth
jurisdiction; though the trading employes are. . . . The primary
and inalienable functions of a constitutional Government . . . are
impossible of performance by private individuals and pertain solely
41And further, that "It is difficult to suppose that any person not indoc-
trinated by a long course of quasi-philosophic and quasi-economic dissertations
would ever apply the term 'industrial' to" the occupation of teaching school.
The opinion of three Justices, which comes closest, therefore, to representing
the "Opinion of the Court" in the case, reviewed definitions or characteristics
of "industrial" employment that had been discussed or suggested in earlier
cases, from any relation "in which the relation of employer and employe sub-
sists," which they declared was "too wide," to employments involving "manual
labor," which they agreed was "too narrow." But anyhow, the "occupation of
the State schoolteacher is not industrial." Isaacs, J. (diss.), pointed out that
such persons as musicians, actors, tramway employes, ships' pilots, street-
lighters, movie operators, barbers, hair-dressers, cab drivers and furniture
movers, seemed without challenge to have been regarded as industrial employes;
and so, how could teaching school possibly be excluded? Education is no State
monopoly in Australia any more-than in America. "Any private individual
could do, and private individuals in fact do,"all that is done under the educa-
tional schemes of Victoria and Tasmania ;" and that "governmental functions"
(e.g., penalizing truancy) are "called in aid" of the State's educational ad-
ministration doesn't alter its "fundamental" character. If it is a function that
"a private person could lawfully do, and being so done," would be industrial,
then it is, industrial when the State does it. In rebuttal, the three Justices men-
tioned above replied "shortly," that "a private person could no more carry on
the system of public education than he could carry on His Majesty's Treas-
ury ;" and if he could, then "he would no more carry on an industry than the
State does now." The educational activities of the State, they insisted, "bear no
resemblance to an ordinary trade, business or industry. They are not directly
connected with or attendant upon the production or distribution of wealth;"
and "there is no cooperation of capital and labor in any relevant sense." So,
per Rich, J. (concurring), that teaching school for the State lacks the "im-
portant element" of "capital and labor cooperating to produce a result which
is the outcome of their combined efforts." Though education may be requisite
to "industrial efficiency," it "cannot be said that the industrial system could
not exist without national education ;" "teaching does not, like banking and
insurance" (Cf. ante, Note 32), "play a part in the scheme of national in-
dustrial activity :" The latter are "indispensable portions of the general in-
dustrial mechanism.... They directly furnish an essential instrument of pro-
duction. This element is totally lacking in the profession of teaching."42Cf. Rex v. Comm. Concil. & Arb. Ct., and E.x parte Vict. (ante, Note
INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA
to the Crown in its regal character ...the legislative power, the
administration of the laws, the . . . judicial power." Although the
majority opinions do not say so, their point of view would seem to
have been influenced materially by the fact that the State public
school systems are not operated for revenue. Yet, as already noted,
the High Court itself had already authorized compulsory arbitra-
tion of a State's dispute with its public harbor employes who, the
report discloses, conducted a non-profit activity of the State.4 3
In view of this history it may be pertinent to suggest that if
compulsory arbitration were to be adopted into our American po-
litical and legal system it had better be made applicable compre-
hensively to the relation between employer and employe, at least
between private employers and their employes, regardless of any
"industrial" character of the employment.
The final requirement of the Australian constitutional pro-
vision is that the dispute must be one "extending beyond the limits
of any one State." A trade union consisting of employes of the rail-
ways owned by the State of New South Wales applied to the Com-
monwealth Arbitration Court for registration. Objection to its
registration was carried to the High Court. That Court remarked a
doubt whether any dispute between this union and the State of New
South Wales, the sole employer of its members, could be a dispute
extending beyond the limits of that State, but without definitely
deciding that point, denied the registration because the employer,
a State, could not be subjected to the Commonwealth's arbitral juris-
diction.4 4 Two years later the High Court considered the applica-
tion of a trade union of coal miners in Victoria. The High Court
approved the registration, but without prejudice to any questions
that might arise later as to its propriety or its constitutional scope
or effect.45 The Court noted, however, that the constitutional pro-
vision does not require that any of the employers or employes in-
43Cf. (ante) Note 36. Cf., accord, the Arbitration Court's own assump-
tion of jurisdiction in the cases cited under Note 37 (ante). In those latter
cases the Arbitration Court of course might be deemed to have erred, especially
if Mr. Justice Isaacs' point of view in the Schoolteachers' Case were to pre-
vail. In the case cited from 25 C. A. R. 1054 (ante, Note 37), it appeared
that the salaries in question were fixed directly by legislation, not by the
State's "Railway Commissioners." In an earlier case a State had inaugurated
some kind of an "ever-normal granary" system and the High Court had held
that the employes that administered it were not "industrial" employes, Aus'n
W"rorkers v. Adelaide Milling Co., (1919) 26 C. L. R. 460. Cf. Federated Mu-
nicipal Union v. City of Melbourne, (1919) 26 C. L. R. 508.
44The Railway Servants' Case, (1906) 4 C. L.k R. 488; cf. (ante),
Note 34.45Jumbunna Coal Mine v. Victoria Coal Miners, (1908) 6 C. L. R. 309.
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volved in a dispute be operating or working in more than one State,
but only that the dispute that arises shall extend beyond the limits
of any one State. A few years later the High Court prohibited the
Arbitration Court from arbitrating a dispute between unionized tram-
way employes and their employers, who severally operated streetcar
systems in cities i'n different States.4" Chief Justice Griffith (concur-
ring), observing that the tramway systems in the several States
were wholly separate and unconnected, declared it was "prima
facie, if not impossible, at least in the highest degree improbable,
that a dispute in any one State should extend to another;" though
"such an extension is in the abstract possible." The same year, over
Chief justice Griffith's dissent, the High Court upheld the Arbitra-
tion Court's jurisdiction of a dispute between a national union of
employes in the building trades and their employers, although each
employer operated only locally and the terms of employment that
were in dispute differed from State to State.47 The decision ap-
parently contradicted assertions of the Chief Justice in an earlier
case that there must be a "common interstate ground," a "common
subject matter" of dispute. If the whole dispute in one State, e.g.,
were over wages, and in another State over the closed shop, there
could be no interstate industrial dispute within the Commonwealth
jurisdiction.48
Chief justice Griffith's point of view apparently would make it
impossible for the Commonwealth Arbitration Court to entertain
a "dispute" consisting of a purely sympathetic strike in one State
to support demands made upon employers in another State, but
like all the rest of his constitutional doctrines respecting th Fed-
eral arbitral power, this one too has progressively gone by the
board. More and more, effective authority over industrial con-
ditions has concentrated in the hands of the Commonwealth Ar-
bitration Court.48
An arbitration system cannot fairly be called compulsory with-
out provision for applying legal coercion, 'if need be, to make the
46The Tramways Case, (1914) 19 C. L. R. 43.
47EX parte Jones, (1914) 18 C. L. R. 224.
48 In Federated Employes v. Moore & Sons, (1909) 8 C. L. R. 465. Cf.(ante), Note 16.
49Cf. the Sawmillers' Case (1929) 43 C. L. R. 185; Caledonian Collieries
v. Aus'n Coal Employes, (1930) 42 C. L. R. 527, 558, distinguished, per
Evatt, J. (comwurring), in Aus'n Tramways 'Ass'n v. Comm'rs, (1937) 58
C. L. R. 436, "An individual dispute tvliich at first does not extend beyond
one State may be the origin of a genuine interstate dispute .... In Australia
as elsewhere, serious and extensive industrial dispttes have often arisen from
local disputes which at first seemed of trifling importance."
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parties abide by the award. In the case of the Wolff Packing Co. v.
the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations5" the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a compulsory arbitration statute of the
State, largely on that ground. The Court remarked that to require
the employer to abide by the award was tantamount to requiring
him to stay in business; which might mean, at a loss, so that the
ultimate effect would be confiscatory. At that time the Court held
general minimum-wage laws to be unconstitutional."' Now that the
States, and the United States Government too, in the District of
Columbia or in the field of interstate commerce, may by statute
prescribe minimum wages, why may they not adjust them through
the procedures of compulsory arbitration ?52 However, a minimum-
wage law, simpliciter, has no such drastic effect as compulsory
arbitration. The former does not require an employer either to
engage or to retain any employe in his service, nor to stay in busi-
ness. At any rate, ever since the original Kansas Case-3 it seems
generally to have been taken for granted in this country that com-
pulsory arbitration might be unconstitutional and so, as is well
known, while our more recent labor relations laws require em-
ployers and employes' organizations to "bargain collectively," they
have carefully refrained from undertaking to require them to ar-
rive at any actual agreement with each other.
Where a State is the employer the Australian courts have been
forced to recognize that they cannot make the employing State pay
the wages awarded since disbursement of public funds, as in this
country, depends on legislative appropriation. 4 It is suggested
again, that if compulsory arbitration were ever to be put into opera-
tion in this country, it had better not be made to cover Government
employes, Federal, State or municipal. But in the field of private
employment the Australian Constitution, as already noted, does not
disable the Commonwealth from equipping its arbitration system
50(1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103; (1925) 267 U..S.
552, 45 S. Ct. 441, 69 L. Ed. 785.
5'Cf. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394,
67 L. Ed. 785.
52Cf West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, (1936) 300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct.
578, 81 L. Ed. 703. Cf. the present writer, in 29 Va. Law Rev., (1943) 881,
937, and cf. U. S. v. Darby (ante, Note 12).
53Cf. (ante), Note 50.
r4Cf. Joseph v. N. S. W., (1918) 25 C. L. R. 32; Aus'n Rys. Union v.
Vict. Ry. Comm'rs, (1930) 44 C. L. R. 319; N. S. W. v. Bardolph, (1934)
52 C. L. R. 455; and cf. the present writer, in 29 Va. Law Rev., (1943) 881,
941, 1028, 1060-1061.
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with as ample and formidable a: set of teeth as Parliament may deem
requisite. 55
To prevent strikes and lockouts is a prime objective of any
system of labor arbitration, and the Commonwealth Arbiti'ation
statute from an early date, if not from its very beginning, forbade
"any person" to do "on account of any industrial dispute, anything'
in the nature of lockout or strike," under criminal penalties. On
appeal from a conviction thereunder the High Court upheld the
statute.5 6 An accompanying Commonwealth enactment penalized
anyone who should "incite" others to strike or lockout, and au-
thorized enjoining any newspaper publishing such an incitement.
These provisions likewise were sustained in the High Court.5 7 A
strike of course does not intend to dissolve the relation of employer
and employe. The very purpose of a strike is to maintain that re-
lationship and to resume work upon terms more advantageous to
the strikers. So in an early case the High Court said that the
Arbitration Court's award of a minimum wage scale imposed upon
the employes no obligation to accept (nor, a fortiori, to continue in)
employment at that scale or at all.58 In other words, while an em-
ploye must not go on strike, he might quit the job after the Arbitra-
tion Court had made its award if he found that the terms of em-
ployment which the award authorized the employer to maintain
were disadvantageous to himself. The resulting precarious ef-
fectiveness of the awards and general instability of such a situation
are obvious enough. It has already been noted that the individual
employe had no access to the Arbitration Court. Only registered
trade unions could make "plaint" to it." But to what point would
wage scales, hours, sanitary conditions, rest periods, vacation al-
lowances, and so forth and-so forth, be awarded, if the award im-
posed no binding obligation on the individual members of the union
that had invoked the Court's juirisdiction? The Australian States
already had statutes to penalize, employes who quit an employment
in breach of contract.10 Does not the Commonwealth Arbitration
5aCf. (ante), Notes 7, 8, 17 and text.
56Stemp v. Aus'n Glass Mnfrs., (1917) 23 C. L. R. 226.57Graziers' Ass'n v. Labor Daily, (1930) 44 C. L. R. 1. The Australian
Constitution guarantees neither "free speech" (except on the floor of Par-
liament) nor a "free press." Cf. U. S. Const. Amend. I.58Comm'th SS. Owners v. Waterside Workers, (1916) 21 C. L. R. 642.
59Cf. the Act (ante, Note 14), sec. 55; and cf. sec. 19.6OUnder our Thirteenth Amendment, quitting one's employment in breach
of contraft probably cannot be made a crime in this country, though it will of
course ground a civil cause of action for damages and, in certain cases for
negative injunction forbidding acceptance of any other employment; and per-
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Court's award have at least as much force as a party's own volun-
tary contract? Under the Act the awards are expressed to continue
in force for a stated length of time, and it has already been noted
that the Act authorizes the Arbitration Court to prescribe penalties
for violation of its awards.61 Conceivably such penalties might be
directed only against the union "as such"-a fine to be collected
out of the union's treasury; a cancellation of its registration, which
would deny it future access to the Arbitration Court. Actually it
goes farther than that. A federal award having prescribed penalties
for its violation, a member of a trade union that was party to the
award quit the employment in breach of a contract made pursuant
to the award. The State of New South Wales convicted him of
violating its own statute penalizing such breach of contract. The
High Court reversed the conviction on the express ground, how-
ever, that the penalties fixed by the award itself were exclusive and
under the paramount Commonwealth authority superseded the
State statute as to persons bound by the award.6 2 The decision
gives the Commonwealth Arbitration Court's award a legislative
force, overriding "inconsistent" State laws.63
In its present form the Arbitration Act forbids any employe to
"cease work in the service of his employer" because his employer is
a member or officer of an employers' organization or has testified
in an arbitration proceeding, under penalty of a fine which may
amount to 25 pounds, a hundred dollars or more. It is further pro-
vided that, in any prosecution for so doing, if it is shown that the
accused did quit the employment, "it shall lie upon" him "to prove
baps it can be made a crime to accept pay in advance with the present intention
not to do the work; Bailey v. Ala., (1911) 219 U. S. 219, 31 S. Ct. 145, 55
L. Ed. 191; In Re Lennon, (1897) 166 U. S. 548, 17 S. Ct. 658, 41 L. Ed.
1110;'and cf. Stevens, "Involuntary Servitude by Injunction," 6 Cornell Law
Quarterly 509.
GICf. (ante), Note 22, and Cf. the Act, sec. 38. According to Chief
Justice Griffith's original ideas, employes' discontent with the terms of an
award could not enable their organization to apply to the Arbitration Court
to change the terms before expiration of the time for which it had been
promulgated. Such discontent, he insisted, was not an "industrial dispute."
It was not indeed a dispute at all; it was merely a desire to act illegally. Like-
wise, in his view, any dispute as to the interpretation of an arbitral award was
not an "industrial dispute" for the Arbitration Court to settle; but presented
merely a question of law for the ordinary courts to adjudicate. Cf. his opinions
in the cases cited (ante), Notes 10-12, 16, 20, 24-26. But like the other features
of his doctrine, already discussed, so these contentions too did not prevail
after he had ceased to be a member of the Bench.
62E.r parte McLean, (1930) 43 C. L. R. 472.
03Cf. (ante), Notes 16-29; and text. Cf. accord, the present writer in 29
Va. Law Rev., (1943) 881, 899ff, 904, n. 16.
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that he was not actuated by the reason alleged in the charge." 64
The Act further authorizes the Arbitration Court to cancel, wholly
or in part, an award it has made in favor of any organization a "sub-
stantial part" of whose membership "refuses to accept employment"
either at all or on the terms awarded, and the Court may order
each individual member of an organization to contribute personally
to any penalty the Court has imposed on the organization, not to
exceed 10 pounds per member.65 Such provisions tie the union
workman to his organization and to the terms of employment
awarded by the Arbitration Court for (or against) his organization,
and tend to make him continue in the employment upon the terms
awarded.6 6 The whole scheme of the Act also subjects all workmen
to great pressure to be union members, since only trade unions can
obtain awards, from-the employes' side. On the other band an indi-
vidual employer may apply for an award if he employs at least a
hundred employes in "any industry. ' 67 But the tendency of course
has been to agglomerate both employes' and employers' organiza-
tions into huge nation wide bodies through which the Common-
wealth Arbitration Court's awards control employment and the
terms of employment throughout ever widening industrial areas. 68
The Act finally enables the union dues and fines assessed under
64Sec. 9(2), (4); and cf. sec. 58BA, that no officer or agent of any
organization shall "advise, encourage or incite" any member of the em-
ployes' organization to "refrain from" accepting employment or working in
accordance with the terms of the award, under penalty of a fine, to a maximum
of 20 pounds.65Secs. 38D and 69; and cf. sec. 49, that "no person shkll wilfully make
default in compliance" with any order or award of the Arbitration Court,
under penalty of a fine, to 20 pounds maximum. Reciprocal provisions, it
should be mentioned, forbid an employer to dismiss an employe or threaten
him with dismissal or "prejudice him in his employment" because he is a
union member or official or has testified before the Arbitration Court. Sec.
9(1).66The Act however does allow a member to resign from his union by
"changing his industry" or by three months' notice, with full payment of his
union dues. Sec. 61.6
7Cf. (ante), Note 59. By Sec. 55 of the Act, a trade union must have at
least 100 members to be registered with the Court.68An employes' organization is to comprise at least 100 members in "any
industry or industries;" so, an "agglomeration of separated and differing
enterprises or occupations may . . . be an 'industry' for the purposes of the
Act"; per Latham, C. J. (concurring), in Melbourne and Metropolitan Tram-
ways Board v. Municipal Officers' Ass'n of Australia, (1944) 68 C. L. R. 628.
The rules of the Municipal Officers' Association declared it to be an or-
ganization of employes engaged in "the municipal industry;" which the rules
further defined as employes of any "local Government authority" working as
"clerks, secretaries, engineers, surveyors, architects, electricians, inspectors,
receivers, paymasters, treasurers, accountants, auditors, valuers, rate-col-
lectors, registrars, foremen, overseers, curators, draftsmen, superintendents,
typists and stenographers."
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union rules to be sued for and recovered by action in the Arbitra-
tion Court or any other court, but the union can expel a member
only on application to and approval by the Arbitration Court.65 All
this manifestly turns the unions into Government agencies, as
were the Guilds of the Middle Ages, and makes imperative a meas-
ure of Government control over the internal management and pol-
icies of the unions. So, to be registered under the Arbitration Act
a union must submit its constitution and by-laws to the Arbitration
Court's approval, which may "disallow" any rules that are illegal
or "tyrannical or oppressive" or unreasonable, and may also cancel
the registration of any union whose rules do not "provide reason-
able facilities for admission of new members," or whose accounts
have not bean "duly audited" or fail to disclose its "true financial
position. ' 7 And to abolish the early abuse by which union officials
would make demands and "plaint" to the Arbitration Court with-
out reference to the membership or evidence of discontent on the
members' part with the existing situation,71 the Act now provides
that without the Court's own approval plaint shall be made -only
pursuant to resolution of the general membership adopted in meet-
ing or by ballot, or on written consent signed by a majority of the
organization's "Committee of Management. ' 72 To implement these
provisions the Act now opens the Arbitration Court to individuals.
At the Court's discretion it may allow "any person" to be heard
in any proceeding under the Act, and "any person interested" may
apply to the Court to declare that any State law or award made
by State authority is invalid for inconsistency with an award of
the Commonwealth Arbitration Court.7 3 The Court itself, when-
ever it deems it desirable, may summon "any person" whatever to
a "conference" by subpoena, 74 and, if the conference fails to reach
an agreement, the Court has immediate jurisdiction at its own
0OSecs. 68 and 70; and cf. sec. 58E, that the Court may order individual
members to comply with the organization's rules, under penalty of a fine to
50 pounds maximum (about $250). It is said that Mr. Henry Ford (Sr.)
some years ago, before he had made his peace with the C. I. 0., admonishee
his employes to remember, that if they submitted to closed-shop unionizatior
the ultimate effect would be, that a few men, representing the automobile com-
panies and the union, would sit down around a table in New York City and
fix the terms of employment for the industry; "and you" (the individual work-
men) "will be able to work and will have to work anywhere in the industry
only on those terms:
70Cf. secs. 58D, 60.
71Cf. (ante), Note 25 and text.72Sec. 22. Cf. sec. 24, that the Court may adopt and give the force of its
award to a settlement made by agreement of the parties.73Secs. 18B and 30A.
74Sec. 16A.
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discretion, i.e., without formal "plaint" by any of the parties.7 5
Finally, the Arbitration Court now may entertain any industrial
dispute at the request of any State, or which is certified to it by its
own Registrar "in the public interest.
76
A number of the provisions that have been recited apply to em-
ployers' as well as to employes' organizations. If an employer con-
tinues, to maintain conditions of employment contrary to the terms
of an award he may of course be prosecuted. To that extent the Act
is readily enough implemented against employers. But suppose-
pursuing the suggestion of the United States Supreme Court in
the Kansas compulsory arbitration case 7T-an employer finds or
believes that he can do business in conformity to the award only
at a loss that will eventually bankrupt him, and so proposes to go
out of business?- If he sells out to a successor who continues the
business the award will be held binding upon him. The awards thus
become fixed charges against the business enterprise as a continu-
ing entity through changes in its ownership.78 That, to be sure,
might make it impossible for the luckless owner who was the
original party to the award to find a purchaser. .Or, if he simply
moves his business to another locality, the award doubtless could
be held personally binding upon him there.79 But suppose instead,
that he just abandons business and dismantles his plant? Employers
are fond of threatening to do that whenever they profess to find
union demands intolerable. 'The threat usually is mere "bluff." But
not always."0
It is not found that ,Australia as yet has been brought face to
face with this aspect of the problem. But surely in the long run
it will not be possible to force employes to stay on the job under
terms awarded, without correspondingly forcing employers to main-
tain the job. This in the extreme case would mean Government
subsidy to the employer or adopting some other means insuring his
7 5Sec. 19(d).
76Sec. 19(a), (c). And in any proceeding the Commonwealth Attorney-
General may intervene in the public' interest; sec. 18B. The Arbitration
Court's Justices and their agents have comprehensive authority to visit and
inspect places, works and documents, sec. 41; and in all proceedings the
Court is to act according to "equity and good conscience and the substantial
merits, without regard to technicalities or legal forms," and is not bound
by "any rules of evidence, but may inform its mind in ...such manner as
it... thinks just"; sec. 25.
7Cf. (ante), Note 50.
78Cf. the cases cited (ante), Note 24.
79If the writer recollects correctly, that is what the Strutwear Knitting
Mills did, after the severe labor difficulties it encountered in Minneapolis.
80Cf. the case of Mr. Higgins, as recently exploited in the newspapers.
INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA
ability to stay in business. "If, as and when" the situation comes
to that, will not Mr. Belloc's Servile State have arrived?"' It may
be remembered that shortly after Pearl Harbor Australia's late
Premier, Mr. Curtin, assured the United States that, as an ally,
it would find that the Australian Government was one that could
give "orders" and command obedience. Mayhap he was alluding to
the "bill of rights" limitations that restrict American political
power in the field of labor relations. Regulations issued under war
time legislation authorized a Commonwealth "Director" to direct
"any person resident in Australia to engage in employment under
... the employer specified in the direction," as well as forbidding
an employer to engage an employe except under permit from the
Director, and the High Court sustained the regulation -.8 2 Other-
wise, it is not found that the "defence power" under war conditions
has served greatly to expand the Commonwealth's authority under
the industrial arbitration subsection.
8 3
Whatever Australian businessmen may think, it cannot be said
that the Australian situation has proven obnoxious to the wage-
earning population of the country. Premier Curtin himself was
the head of a Labor Party Government and every attempt to amend
the industrial provisions of the Constitution has been defeated.84
8'Cf. (ante), Note 2.
82Reid v. Sinderberry and Reid v. McGrath, (1944) 68 C. L: R. 504.
Under our Thirteenth Amendment it is probably doubtful that even the "war
power" would enable the United States Government to enforce such compre-
hensive "industrial conscription."83The High Court has held that in war-time the Commonwealth Arbitra-
tion Court can be empowered to settle any "industrial dispute," even though it
does not extend "beyond the limits of any one State." Cf. (ante), Notes 44-49,
and text; and cf. Victoria v. Comm'th, (1942) 66 C. L. R. 488; Vict. Chamber
of Mfrs. v. Comm'th, (1943) 67 C. L. R. 347, 413, per Williams, J., that the
defense power isn't "paramount" to all others, and that the "Constitution does
not become in war-time a unitary constitution." And per Latham, C. J., that
exercise of the defence power does not mean, that "all governmental power
in Australia may . . .be concentrated in Commonwealth authorities," Ex
parte APMEU, (1943) 67 C. L. R. 619, holding "jurisdictional disputes"
subject to the Arbitration Court's jurisdiction. It is not necessary that a
dispute be one of employers against- their own employes; iand under the de-
fence power it is immaterial whether the dispute be one extending beyond
the limits of any one State, vel non; Pidoto v. Victoria, (1943) 68 C. L. R.
87. The Arbitration Court may be given jurisdiction over any "industrial
matter" which in a Minister's opinion "has led or is likely to lead to in-
dustrial unrest" (in war-time), even though no actual dispute subsists; Ex
parte Victoria, (1944) 68 C. L. R. 485. Cf. (ante), Notes 30, 39, 42.84Tramway employes demanded that they be allowed to wear their trade-
union badges while on duty. This being refused, and the matter brought
before the Arbitration Court, it was objected, that this could not be deemed
an "industrial dispute." The High Court held that it was; but the "rugged
individualism" of the typical "independent" businessman was perhaps ex-
pressed by acting Chief Justice Barton (dissenting), that the Constitution did
22 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The actual relation of the individual Australian workingman to his
trade union appears to be fundamentally political in character. It
resembles strikingly the relation of the single citizen to the Gov-
ernment of the Republic, to-wit: He takes part in choosing the
officials who govern him and the conditions under which he lives
and works, and he may also have a vote in the direct determination
of legislative measures, or trade union policy; yet in the large and
at the last, he must conform himself to decisions made by others,
by the officials whom he has voted-for (or against) or by the
majority of his fellow citizens or fellow members (of the union).
That situation no doubt may fairly be called "economic democracy."
It corresponds to our political democracy, but it lends point to the
remarks quoted from a Melbourne newspaper in comment on the
British Labor Party's recent victory at the polls, that the British
workingman evidently had decided to exchange an economic order
of personal liberty for one of "socialized regimentation." It is per-
haps not impossible that our Arherican workingmen may arrive
some day at the same conclusion. 5
not enable the Commonwealth Arbitration Court "so far to encroach on the
powers of the States as to place the general control of industrial enterprises
in the hands of employes in place of the owners because the Court is satisfied
that otherwise the employes will not rest in that contentment without which
it is feared that industrial peace will not continue. I think further, that the
owner of a business has still the right, subject to the law of his State, to de-
cline to contract for the services of any.man unless he wants him .... It fol-
lows, that he heed only accept a man's services on such terms as in his own
judgment are not calculated to injure his business .... Strange as it may
seem to some, the employer may decline to give the man the right to have
wages from him unless the man will agree to obey any lawful orders" (of
the employer), "even as to matters . . .not part of the employment itself"
(e.g., such matters as wearing a trade-union badge while on duty) ; Aus'n
Tramway Employes v. Prahan Tramway Trust, (1913) 17 C. L. R. 680. But
Mr. Justice Barton's "hedging remark" may be noticed, "subject to the law
of his State," because any one of the Australian States could unquestionably
do any of the things he was insisting the Commonwealth could not do.
85 Notwithstanding the progressive insertion of "teeth" into Australian
compulsory arbitration and the outlawry of strikes and lock-outs, it seems
that they have not been too effectively avoided. Australia has suffered severe
and violent labor disturbances; and the Minneapolis Star Journal has very
recently told of a Commonwealth-State conference called to consider ways
and means for composing "spreading strikes in New South Wales." Issue
for November 13th, "1945, p. 17, under the heading--"On the Worldwide
News Front."
